Report of the Advisory Panel on the History of the 20th Century and on Japan’s Role and the World Order in the 21st Century

August 6, 2015

The Advisory Panel on the History of the 20th Century and on Japan’s Role and World Order in the 21st Century
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Dates of Sessions, Themes of Discussion, Presenters

The first session  February 25, 2015

The second session  March 13, 2015
Theme: How should we view the history of the world and Japan in the 20th century? What are the lessons we should learn from the experiences of the 20th century?
Presenter: Shinichi KITAOKA  Deputy Chairman of the Advisory Panel
Naoya OKUWAKI  Professor, Graduate School of Law, Meiji University; Professor Emeritus, The University of Tokyo; Former President, Japanese Society of International Law

The third session  April 2, 2015
Theme: What is the path that Japan has taken in the 70 post-war years in light of the lessons learned from the 20th century? In particular, how should the commitment to peace, economic development and international contributions by post-war Japan be evaluated?
Presenter: Akihiko TANAKA  President, Japan International Cooperation Agency(JICA)
Yukio OKAMOTO  Advisory Panel Member

The fourth session  April 22, 2015
Theme: How did Japan pursue reconciliation with the United States, Australia, and European countries in the 70 years after the war?
Presenter: Fumiaki KUBO  Professor, The University of Tokyo
Yuichi HOSOYA  Professor, Keio University

The fifth session  May 22, 2015
Theme: How did Japan pursue reconciliation with China, the Republic of Korea and other Asian countries in the 70 years after the war?
Presenter: Shin KAWASHIMA  Advisory Panel Member
Shunji HIRAIWA  Professor, Kansei Gakuin University
Takashi SHIRAISHI  Advisory Panel Member
The sixth session       June 25, 2015
Theme: What is our vision of Asia and the world of the 21st Century, drawing on the
lessons learned from the 20th century? What are the contributions that Japan
should make?
What are the specific measures that Japan should take on the occasion of the
70th anniversary of the end of the World War II?
Presenter: Masayuki YAMAUCHI       Advisory Panel Member
Masashi HANEDA       Advisory Panel Member

The seventh session       July 21, 2015       *exchange of opinions on report
Introduction

The first session of the Advisory Panel was held on February 25th, 2015 where Prime Minister Abe presented the following five points as the issues for discussion by the Panel.

1. How should we view the history of the world and Japan in the 20th century? What are the lessons we should learn from the experiences of the 20th century?

2. What is the path that Japan has taken in the 70 post-war years in light of the lessons learned from the 20th century? In particular, how should the commitment to peace, economic development and international contributions by post-war Japan be evaluated?

3. How did Japan pursue reconciliation with the United States, Australia, and European countries in the 70 years after the war? How did Japan pursue reconciliation with China, the Republic of Korea and other Asian countries in the 70 years after the war?

4. What is our vision of Asia and the world of the 21st Century, drawing on the lessons learned from the 20th century? What are the contributions that Japan should make?

5. What are the specific measures that Japan should take on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the end of the World War II?

The Advisory Panel held seven sessions to discuss the issues presented by Prime Minister. This Report by the Panel reflects the discussions in these sessions and is compiled along the points presented by Prime Minister. The Panel hopes that this Report serves as a reference for the statement to be issued on the 70th anniversary of the end of the war.
1. How should we view the history of the world and Japan in the 20th century? What are the lessons we should learn from the experiences of the 20th century?

(1) The History of the World and Japan in the 20th Century
(a) From Imperialism to International Cooperation

To look back at the 20th century, we would like to briefly revisit the 19th century. What characterizes the 19th century is the overwhelming superiority obtained by the West over the rest of the world through technological innovation. The defeat of China, which at many stages in world history had been the largest country in the world and still boasted the largest economy in around 1830, by Great Britain in the Opium War—an extremely unjust war—was a monumental event in world history that highlighted this widening technological gap.

This technological gap became the backdrop for the colonization, largely by Western countries, of the rest of the world. In Asia, Japan, which modernized itself in order to avoid being colonized, made Taiwan its colony by defeating China in the Sino-Japanese War (1895), while Germany, which had not been much engaged in Asia, also brought the Shandong Province under its sway when it secured a lease on Jiaozhou Bay, using the murder of German missionaries as the pretext (1898). Even the United States, an ex-colony that had won its independence and often opposed colonialism as a result, brought the Philippines into its domain as a colony through its victory in the Spanish-American War (1898).

However, the beginning of the 20th century saw the brakes placed on colonization. The Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 not only stopped Russian expansion, but also encouraged much of the indigenous population in the non-Western lands colonized by the West. There were many among the leaders of the Asian and African countries that achieved independence just before and after 1960 who had been deeply moved to hear stories of the Russo-Japanese War from their forbearers.

Putting further brakes on colonization was the principle of “self-determination,” one of the Fourteen Points for world peace put forward by Woodrow Wilson near the end of World War I. Self-determination was initially a concept aimed at Europe, but it resonated in Asia as well, and became a catalyst for the March First Incident in Korea and the May Fourth Movement in China and the like.

However, many of the Great Powers had no intentions of giving up their colonies, and as a result, a general agreement was reached under which there would be no more expansion of their colonies. In the Asia-Pacific region, the Nine-Power Treaty was concluded, which guaranteed that China’s unification and independence would be respected.

In the meantime, technological innovation made war an increasingly disastrous and massive undertaking. By the end of the 19th century, movements had emerged to settle disputes by arbitration. As World War I took a toll on an unprecedented scale in human history, the movement for the outlawry of war aiming at denying war under international law further gathered force. The Covenant of the League of Nations imposed “obligations not to
resort to war” on its members, and the 1928 General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy (the Kellogg–Briand Pact) outlawed war as an instrument of national policy. These developments were paralleled by the Washington Naval Conference in 1922 and the London Naval Conference in 1930, where limiting naval armament was discussed, resulting in a measure of success.

During the 1920s, the Great Powers refrained from military expansion and poured their energy into economic activities. Japan also saw the development of government by political parties, and party governments held power continuously from 1924 to 1932, while the Universal Manhood Suffrage Act was enacted in 1925. On the diplomatic front as well, diplomacy focused on international cooperation, known as the Shidehara Diplomacy, became mainstream.

However, the stability of the 1920s was a fragile one. In the world, the United States, which should have been the leader, did not join the League of Nations. In Japan, the superiority of political parties lacked an institutional foundation, and the military was very much an independent power. Although those favoring international cooperation had the upper hand, their influence was damaged by the turn of events such as the defeat of the Racial Equality Proposal at the Paris Peace Conference and the Congressional rejection of Japanese for naturalization in the United States, making them ineligible for immigration quotas.

(b) From the Great Depression to World War II
The onset of the Great Depression in the United States in 1929 brought great changes to the world as well as to Japan. The German economy, which had relied on funds flowing in from the United States, collapsed, and the Nazi and Communist Parties made gains there.

The high tariffs policy adopted by the United States dealt a massive blow to Japanese exports to the United States. Great Britain and France also proceeded to form economic blocs of their own. In Japan, the influence of people who favored cooperation with Great Britain and the United States waned, while forces, which believed that Japan had no choice but to expand through the use of force, were in the ascendance. In particular, mid-tier officers in the Army worried about the challenge of Chinese nationalism to Japanese interests in Manchuria and the revival of the Soviet Union as a military power. When they staged the Manchurian Incident to secure Japanese interests by force, the political parties and those favoring international cooperation no longer had the power left to keep this under their control.

By then, Italy had already come under Mussolini’s dictatorship, and Stalin’s dictatorship was firmly in place in the Soviet Union. In Germany, the Nazis increased the number of its seats in the Reichstag. The notion was spreading that this was no longer the era of liberal democracy.

A policy of building a powerful totalitarian political regime at home and demanding redistribution of the colonies from the “haves” such as Great Britain and the United States abroad gradually came to be accepted.
Thus, after the Manchurian Incident, Japan expanded its aggression against the continent, deviated from the post-World War I shift towards self-determination, outlawry of war, democratization, and an emphasis on economic development, lost sight of the global trends, and caused much harm to various countries, largely in Asia, through a reckless war. In China in particular, this created many victims across wide areas. In addition, the military sent out soldiers to the frontlines without even minimal supplies and weaponry, and did not allow them to be held as prisoners of war, causing their deaths in many cases. Not only Hiroshima, Nagasaki and Tokyo, the target city of Great Air Raid, but also many other cities all over Japan were reduced to ashes as they were subjected to air raids with fire bombs. Okinawa in particular turned into a horrible battlefield, as one-third of the entire population there died. In the colonies, Japan acted counter to the tide of self-determination. Colonial rule became particularly harsh from the second half of the 1930s on.

It must be said that the responsibilities of the Japanese government and military leaders from the 1930s and beyond are very serious indeed.

To be sure, many nations in Asia gained independence as a result of the Japanese war from the 1930s up to 1945. Nevertheless, many decisions were made in the name of self-preservation and self-defense, (And of course the substance and the direction of the self-preservation and self-defense were wrong.) and rarely were they made to liberate Asia. Indeed, there were Japanese people who fought to liberate Asia, and the independence of Asian colonies progressed as the outcome. However, it is inaccurate to claim that Japan fought to liberate Asia as a matter of national policy.

(c) After World War II
World War II resulted in an unprecedented number of victims amounting to tens of millions worldwide, and left deep wounds in the international community. Japan itself lost approximately 3.1 million precious lives. In the second half of the 20th century, the international community embarked on the construction of a new system with a resolute determination that the terrible miseries of a massive war must never be repeated again.

The foremost priority for the international community was prevention of war and establishment of peace. Learning from the lessons of the failure of the League of Nations, which had been unable to prevent World War II, the United Nations was founded in 1945. The United Nations banned the use of force in principle in international relations by Article 2 of Chapter 1 of its Charter, a norm that became the linchpin for world peace in the post-war era. On this point, Japan can be described as the country that has adhered most strictly to the principle of renunciation of war in the UN Charter in the post-war era. In its post-war

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1 There were some dissenting views in the Panel concerning the use of the word “aggression”. The reasons for this were 1) the definition of “aggression” has not been established under international law; 2) there is objection from a historical perspective to stating that the series of events from the Manchurian Incident onward constituted “aggression”; and 3) there is a sense of reluctance towards stating that only the actions of Japan constituted “aggression” while other countries were taking similar actions.
history under Article 9, paragraph 1 of the Constitution, Japan has never once sought to pursue its self-interests through military action. Constant opposition to changing territories, etc. by force anywhere in the world is a sentiment that has been broadly shared and deeply ingrained among the Japanese people in post-war Japan, and has been consistently embodied in policies of the Japanese Government.

Equal in importance to the post-war international order was the development of a free trade system. In order to prevent the chain of events that became a factor leading to World War II from recurring – the development from the Great Depression to the creation of economic blocs and further to the collapse of the international trade system – the Bretton Woods system was built immediately after the end of the war, and the international free trade system was established under the GATT regime. The post-war world economy developed impressively under this system, and Japan, as a key member of this system, achieved economic growth. Almost no one believed anymore in the pre-war notion of the expansion of “lebensraum” by force, and instead the overwhelming majority of the people sought prosperity through free trade. And through this process, Japan has provided a national model for prosperity through peace and economic development for the Asian countries and beyond.

Furthermore, what must not be forgotten is the fact that the self-determination movement born in the aftermath of World War I came to fruition for many Asian and African countries after World War II in the form of independence and decolonization. The Asian-African Conference in 1955, in which Japan also participated, adopted a communique that denounced colonialism and sought respect for basic human rights. During the 1950s and the 1960s, many countries in Asia and Africa achieved independence through this process. The era before World War II when powerful countries ruled over others by force had ended, and a new world where all countries would enjoy equal rights was created.

(d) The Development of International Law in the 20th Century
As if it were symbolizing the tumult of the history of the 20th century that we have just revisited, the nature of international law also changed greatly between the first and second halves of the 20th century. International law in the first half of the 20th century had a passive character that aimed at reducing causes for disputes upon the clearly limited concept of disputes between states. And the focus of its main objective was limited to controlling war, while economic and social issues were considered to be matters within the domestic jurisdiction of individual states and outside of the discipline of international law. As for controlling war, international law successfully created a major trend towards the renunciation of war through the 1919 Covenant of the League of Nations and the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact outlawing war. However, although the Covenant of the League of Nations tightened the procedures for resorting to war, it did not forbid the very act of resorting to war, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact also left room for the interpretation of the scope of self-defense as an exception and the “use of force that does not amount to war.” With regard to the definition of “aggression” under international law, although there are efforts such as the UN General
Assembly Resolution on the Definition of Aggression adopted in 1974, there are some who point out that the international community has yet to reach a complete consensus.

International law of the second half of the 20th century has been transformed into a means which plays a proactive role of promoting the realization of common interests of the respective states. Drawing on the lessons of World War II, the United Nations was established as a framework through which international community would jointly prevent the use of force. Also, since the collapse of the international trade system became one of the factors leading to the outbreak of World War II, there were rapid moves towards promoting international cooperation and developing norms on the social and economic fronts through international law. The development of norms on human rights and environment also took place. We have already explained how Japan, which withdrew from the League of Nations and resorted to the use of force in an attempt to use a loophole in the Kellogg–Briand Pact in the lead-up to the war, has been most faithful to Article 9, paragraph 1 of the Constitution and the principles of the UN Charter renouncing war, and has transformed itself into an proactive contributor in a wide variety of activities with the United Nations at the core.

(2) Lessons to Be Learned from the 20th Century
What are the lessons that we should learn from the 20th century? First is the establishment of the principle that international disputes shall be settled not by force but by peaceful means. Changing the status quo by force must not be allowed. Second is the promotion of democratization. The process must not be forgotten in which totalitarian states hurtled along the road to war as a result of the military, as well as certain forces, trampling over the human rights of citizens and running amok. Third is the free trade system. The world economy in the second half of the 20th century developed under a free trade system based on the reflections over the fact that the construction of economic blocs following the Great Depression and the collapse of the international trade system had been a cause of World War II. Fourth is self-determination. The history of colonial rule in the first half of the 20th century, where powerful countries ruled over others by force, was ended, and the world was transformed into a place where all countries took part in the international order with equal rights and self-respect. Fifth is support for these newly created states and promotion of their economic development, since poverty can easily become a cause of conflict. Peace, rule of law, liberal democracy, respect for human rights, the free trade system, self-determination, support for the economic development of developing countries, etc. are all lessons that we have learned from the tragedies of the first half of the 20th century.

This course that the world has taken overlaps with the course taken by Japan, in which it developed as one of the core members of the international community in the second half of the 20th century after being reduced to rubble in World War II. In the first half of the 20th century, Japan was still a poor, largely agricultural country, and the idea came to prevail in the 1930s that development would be secured by territorial expansion instead of building wealth through industry and trade. The political system in pre-war Japan was also flawed.
Although Japan had developed as the first democratic state in Asia since the Meiji Era, the Meiji Constitution set up a pluralistic system that was too difficult for consolidation, and the authority of the prime minister to command did not extend to the military, which meant that the government had no means of control when the Kwantung Army ran out of control. And the self-righteous military tightened censorship over the Japanese people as the state of the war worsened, and democracy in Japan ceased to function. In the face of Japan, which attempted to secure “lebensraum” through military force, the system of international sanctions was weak. Consequently, the international community was unable to stop Japan.

However, in the second half of the 20th century, based on the deep remorse over the war, Japan has been reborn as a country that is completely different from what it was in the first half of the 20th century, particularly in the period between the 1930s and the first half of the 1940s. Peace, rule of law, liberal democracy, respect for human rights, the free trade system, self-determination, support for the economic development of developing countries, etc. are what characterize post-war Japan; does this not best embody the lessons that the whole world has learned from the tragedies of the war and the years leading up to it?
2. What is the path that Japan has taken in the 70 post-war years in light of the lessons learned from the 20th century? In particular, how should the commitment to peace, economic development, and international contributions by post-war Japan be evaluated?

(1) The History of Japan in the 70 Post-War Years
(a) From Defeat in War to High Economic Growth

Learning from the failures of the pre-war years, post-war Japan took a path of economic reconstruction and prosperity on the basis of modern and universal principles of peace, rule of law, liberal democracy, respect for human rights, the free trade system, self-determination, support for the economic development of developing countries, etc. within the international political and economic system constructed after the war.

Having been reduced to rubble in the war and brought under occupation with the defeat by the Allied Forces led by the United States, Japan faced an urgent task of recovering independence and membership in the international community as well as rebuilding its economy. Japan restored independence in 1952 through the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which it had signed in 1951. It subsequently normalized relations individually with the countries that had not been signatories to the San Francisco Peace Treaty. It reinstated itself as a member in the international community, beginning with its membership in the World Bank and IMF in 1951, followed by joining the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1955, the United Nations in 1956, and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1964. It also concluded reparations agreements with and implemented reparation projects for Burma, the Philippines, Indonesia, and South Vietnam out of the countries with which it had normalized diplomatic relations.

It was in the first half of the 1950s that Japan began providing economic cooperation for other countries in the form of the present official development assistance (ODA). It began providing technical cooperation in 1954 when it joined the Colombo Plan. In 1958, Japan provided its first yen loan for India. Japanese ODA made a major contribution to the economic development of Asian countries through infrastructure development and technical assistance. That said, it cannot be denied that there was an intention to reconstruct the Japanese economy through economic cooperation, as the initial economic cooperation took the form of “tied” aid, meaning that it came with an obligation to procure Japanese products.

The Japanese economy entered into a period of high economic growth beginning in the mid-1950s. Japan laid a foundation for economic reconstruction with assistance from the United States in early years after the war. Japan averaged an annual economic growth rate of over 10% between 1955 and 1973, already becoming the second largest Western economy in the world by overtaking West Germany in 1968. Underpinning this performance was the acceptance of Japanese exports by the international economic system based on free trade that was created after the war under US leadership. The United States in particular supported Japan’s membership of the GATT and became the largest consumer of Japanese textile
products, which was still Japan’s major export item in the 1950s. Since then the United States consistently kept its market open to Japanese products.

However, although Japan had achieved rapid economic growth, it still saw its place in the international community as that of a “small country,” and was not acutely aware that it should contribute to the advancement of international free trade by broadly opening up its own market as one of the major industrialized countries. It also experienced through the process of its high economic growth the “four big pollution diseases,” and other environmental issues as well as serious urban problems.

(b) Japan as an Economic Power

As Japan became an economic power, the world gradually began to turn a critical eye towards it regarding whether Japan had a sense of responsibility commensurate with its national strength and a willingness to contribute to the maintenance of the international political and economic system. The persistent Japanese efforts to increase exports while protecting its domestic market as a late-comer industrial country received criticism, and led to trade friction with the United States. And partly due to lack of sufficient consideration to national sentiments in Southeast Asia, Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka faced intense anti-Japanese demonstrations in Jakarta and Bangkok during his visit to Southeast Asia in 1974.

From that point on in the 1970s, Japanese businesses made direct investments in Asian countries and engaged in local production, beginning the transfer of technology to these countries in full-scale. Japanese businesses built production bases in various Asian countries for their automobiles, electrical appliances and other products. At the same time, they began investing in the development of natural gas, oil and other mineral resources in these countries, which eventually made their way back to Japan as exports. The advance of Japanese businesses into the Asian countries created a virtuous cycle in which the more the technology transfer and support for natural resource development were provided by Japan, the more trade between the two sides was promoted. This has led to the establishment of a relationship of interdependence between the Japanese and Asian economies. The attitude of Japanese businesses towards blending in locally and working side by side with the locals also gained sympathy in Asian countries and beyond. These efforts of the Japanese companies, together with ODA, bore fruit in a big way in improving the image of Japan in Asia. In addition to such exchanges on the economic front, cultural exchanges between Japan and Asia picked up the pace in the 1970s, including with the establishment of the Japan Foundation in 1972.

Japan became a member of the Group of Six (G6) (later the Group of Seven (G7)) when it was set up in 1975 to bring the heads of the major industrialized countries together and broadened its diplomatic horizons. In response to the 1974 anti-Japanese movements in Southeast Asia, Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda announced the “Fukuda Doctrine,” which expressed Japan’s determination not to become a military power, as well as its willingness to establish a “heart-to-heart relationship of mutual confidence and trust” with Southeast Asia not only in the politics and economy, but also in the social and cultural fields, and to
contribute to peace and prosperity in the entire Southeast Asian region. This showed an orientation of Japanese cooperation in Asia and gave great reassurance to the Southeast Asian countries.\(^2\)

However, when it came to security issues, the level of willingness for Japan to actively contribute to the stability of the international order was still low at home. On the economic front as well, Japan steadily engaged in multilateral trade negotiations, contributed to the maintenance of the international monetary system with the United States at its core through the Plaza Accord and other means, despite the existence of severe trade frictions, and eliminated tariff barriers on industrial products. However, Japan showed a certain restraint in promoting free trade globally due to its existent agricultural policy. At the time, Japan remained unable to exert leadership or play a major role in forming and maintaining the international order in relation to the aspects of security and free trade.

It was economic cooperation that Japan chose to promote as a means for international contribution. Around this time, Japan made significant progress in making its ODA untied from the procurement of Japanese products. Japan also became the world’s largest provider of ODA in 1989. True, Japan, embarking on its return from the ruins of defeat, did not contribute much to the construction of the security and economic order, that is, the construction of the post-war system. However, economic cooperation by Japan, which became the largest provider of ODA in the world, contributed to the economic development and social stability of developing countries and thus led to the stability of the international order. In light of this fact Japan’s international contribution, though not glorious or conspicuous, still played an important role in its own right. In addition, Japan’s economic cooperation was not just about the knowledge and technology gained through economic development, particularly from the 1980s onward. It was conducted in a manner that met the need to address challenges that the developing countries faced, drawing on the Japanese experience gained through the process of the need for energy saving in response to the energy crisis, and to overcome pollution and other problems. The fact that such Japanese economic cooperation, which was conducted in a manner to meet the needs of developing countries, contributed efficiently to the development of these countries should also be recognized.

The total amount of Japanese ODA has reached approximately 37.6 trillion yen, of which about 16.6 trillion is in loans, about 16.3 trillion is in grants, and about 4.7 trillion is technical cooperation. Having achieved a miraculous economic recovery after the war with support from abroad, Japan became a supporter itself and has contributed to the economic development of developing countries. This history of Japan’s ODA surely enhanced trust in Japan within the international community.

(c) The Economic Doldrums and the Search for an International Role

The Berlin Wall fell in 1989, bringing the Cold War to an end. In Eastern Europe, country after country experienced democratic revolutions, and the Soviet Union collapsed at the end

\(^2\) See 4(3)(a)
of 1991. During this period, for the first time, Japan provided a large amount of ODA for Eastern European countries to support their democratic reforms and the transition to market economies. These efforts contributed greatly after the end of the Cold War to further strengthen Japan’s already good relations with the Eastern European countries. Japan’s support for democratization was also extended to ASEAN member countries when they democratized one after another in the 1990s, and continues to this day in the form of such means as support for establishing electoral systems and legal reforms.

Japan during the 1990s saw its bubble economy burst, lost confidence as an “economic power,” and reached the point where it had to rethink its identity within the international community. The Japanese economy stagnated, while ODA, which peaked in 1997, went into a steady decline. Currently, the amount of ODA has fallen almost by half since 1997 in initial budget terms, and Japan, once the largest donor in the world, has seen its ranking fall to the fifth.

On the other hand, on the international economic front, Japan began in the 1980s to contribute to the promotion of free trade in the Asia-Pacific region while supporting the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum founded in 1989. China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan joined the APEC after the end of the Cold War, and Russia, Vietnam, and Peru followed in 1998, making it the largest economic forum in the Asia-Pacific region both in name and reality. Japan also provided massive assistance for the countries affected by the Asian Financial Crisis in the second half of the 1990s. The Crisis became a catalyst for the establishment of the Asian Monetary Fund and the Chiang Mai Initiative as well as the creation of many free trade agreements in the region, and the trend towards regionalism gained pace on the economic front.

The coming of the 21st century saw the emergence of the vision of the East Asia Summit (EAS) led by ASEAN, which was going through its own integration process. When the EAS became reality in 2005, the United States was reluctant to its establishment. Nevertheless, Japan greatly contributed to not only bringing in India and Australia as members, but also keeping the door open to future participation by the United States and Russia.

The policy of the Government of Japan to turn the economically ascendant Asia-Pacific region into a free trade area can be traced back to the Pacific Basin Community Concept that Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira proposed in 1980. It continues to this day in the form of trends towards conclusion of a multilayered set of numerous economic partnership agreements in the Asia-Pacific region, including the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations, and other economic partnership agreements currently being negotiated.

(d) Japan’s Progress in the Field of Security
After World War II, Japan steadfastly adhered to the policy of light-armament and peaceful orientation that was made possible by the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, and pushed forward with its economic development. Japan chose the conclusion of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty
and the continued stationing of U.S. forces in Japan in order to ensure its security without the burden of onerous defense expenditures, and to concentrate on economic reconstruction. Japan had little interest in contributing to the stability of the international order in the aspect of security, and continued to achieve economic development under the U.S. protection for decades after the end of the war.

It was on the occasion of the boycott of the Moscow Olympics in response to the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union in 1979 that Japan began using the term “international contribution” extensively in a security context. In January 1980, Prime Minister Ohira announced to the Japanese people that, “there are occasions on which Japan does have to make sacrifices in the service of world peace.” Following this, Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, who participated in the Williamsburg Summit in the United States in 1983, made it clear that Japan would engage in security issues facing the international community, and declared its responsibility and self-awareness as an advanced democratic industrial nation. However, subsequent deeds of Japan did not necessarily match those words. In the 1980s, Japan did have the willingness to engage in security issues, but lacked an awareness of the need to actually take action.

This passive attitude of Japan towards security issues shifted as the 1990s dawned. With the demise of the Cold War and the progress of globalization, non-state actors came to play a major role. At the same time, threats to humanity diversified in the form of sectarian conflict, ethnic strife, and terrorism, giving rise to cases that could not be handled under preexisting notions of security. In the face of this situation, Japan finally began to actively make international contributions from the 1990s going forward by practicing proactive contribution to peace, through the dispatch of minesweepers after the First Gulf War (1991); participation in UN peacekeeping operations (PKO), particularly as part of the support for peace and nation-building in Cambodia (1992-1993); and later, revision of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (1997), refueling activities in the Indian Ocean (2001-2010) as part of the U.S. fight against terrorism that was touched off by the multiple simultaneous terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001; assistance to Afghanistan with the International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan at its core (2002-); humanitarian reconstruction support in Iraq (2003-2009); and anti-piracy activities in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia (2009-). The trajectory of proactive contribution to peace is maintained to this day. However, looking back on the Japanese actions since the first half of the 1990s, it cannot be denied that they have been a half step behind the actual needs. For example, Japan was not able to cooperate in providing transportation and medical care during the Gulf War, participating in patrolling activities in the Indian Ocean, or conducting activities to secure the safety of residents of Iraq. It cannot be said that Japan has been able to properly contribute in a manner that fully responds to the demands of the international community.
(2) Evaluation of the Commitment to Peace, Economic Development, and International Contributions of Post-War Japan

Looking back at post-war history, there has been absolutely no instance among the actions taken by Japan on the international stage that sought to pursue its self-interests through military action. Japan’s post-war trajectory is based on a thorough reflection on its actions in the 1930s and the first half of the 1940s.

At the same time, Japan is one of the countries that have been faithful in their actions to the new liberal international system based on the premises of peace, rule of law, liberal democracy, respect for human rights, the free trade system, self-determination, and support for the economic development of developing countries that was set up under the initiative of the United States, which newly assumed the mantle of global leadership in the second half of the 20th century. The political and economic system that was constructed after the war owed much to the visionary power of the United States, but it also converged with the political, economic and social directions in which the whole human society was maturing. Japan saw both justice and benefits in the post-war liberal international system, and was able to believe that it was in its national interest to support it jointly with other responsible states.

While it was making its way back from the ruins of defeat, Japan for a while concentrated on its own reconstruction. However, in the 1980s, it began to show the will and determination to become a responsible major power that would contribute to the construction and maintenance of the international order, as Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira’s Pacific Basin Community Concept and Prime Minister Nakasone’s proclamation of being “a member of the West” indicated. This path that Japan has taken is paralleled by the maturation of the Japanese people’s consciousness towards foreign affairs.

70 years after the end of the war, Japan, having achieved miraculous economic growth with support from the Western countries, has transformed itself into one of the key members of the international political and economic system, who would contribute to the construction and maintenance of the international order. Japan has been gradually transforming itself from a simple beneficiary of the post-war international order to a responsible state that bears its share of the costs of maintaining the order.

Japan’s international contributions began with ODA and progressed to the promotion of free trade, promotion of regional integration, and finally to contribution on security issues. Japan in the 2000s converted to proactive contribution to peace on security issues, and is striving to steadily enhance its contributions to the international community on the security front through participation in PKO activities and involvement in situations in areas surrounding Japan. In the 70 post-war years, the United States has had an overwhelming presence for the security of Japan. The reason that Japan was able to enjoy peace without having been attacked even once from a foreign country despite its location in East Asia in which countries with the largest numbers of troops in the world concentrate, was in large part the existence of the deterrent power created by the Japan-U.S. security arrangements. Japan has promoted defense cooperation with the United States in a manner commensurate with
the capabilities of the Self-Defense Forces in order to enhance the deterrent power and reliability of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements. However, the fact that Japan fixed the level of the defense budget at “1% of the gross national product or less” instead of properly determining it according to the division of roles and responsibilities between Japan and its ally, the United States, also placed certain limitations on the Japan-U.S. security arrangements. In this manner, Japan managed to maintain its defense expenditures as a percentage of GDP at a level lower than those of more than 100 other countries. However, it will become necessary to reconsider the appropriateness of continuing to link the size of the Japanese defense expenditures to an economic index (GNP) in light of the continuing expansion of China’s military expenditures.

It should be noted that this Japanese policy of commitment to peace and international contribution during the 70 post-war years, which has been held in high esteem by the international community and the Japanese people, was not born suddenly in the aftermath of the war. Japan’s post-war progress is rooted in the liberal democratic system, including the Freedom and People’s Rights Movement and the establishment of a constitutional monarchy after the Meiji Restoration, and the acceptance of the norms of the international community. Of course, the United States played a large role in the establishment of a liberal democracy in post-war Japan and its reentry into the international community. However, it should not be forgotten that the development of democracy from the Meiji Era on as well as Japan’s history of active engagement in the construction of an international order based on international peace, democracy, and free trade are connected with post-war Japan at a fundamental level3.

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3 See 3(1)(a)
3. How did Japan pursue reconciliation with the United States, Australia, and European countries during the 70 years after the war?

(1) 70 Years of Reconciliation with the United States
(a) The Occupation Era
Given the unprecedented horrors of World War II that preceded it, it was unavoidable that there would be a punitive element by the victors in the occupation of Japan by the Allied Powers led by the United States. In this sense, it cannot be denied that not a few Japanese had something to be discontented with regarding the occupation by the United States. That said, the occupation, which continued from 1945 to 1952, was overall generous towards Japan and largely beneficial for Japanese people. As the significant harshness of the occupation of East Germany and the Eastern European countries by the Soviet Union shows, occupation could result in a situation akin to looting and exploitation by the victor. However, the United States did nothing in Japan that amounted to blatant exploitation. Rather, the United States came to lend a hand of rescue to Japan in dire straits with food and other post-war assistance. The demilitarization of Japan did have an aspect of punishment of the vanquished by the victor. However, although guiding Japan towards democracy and supporting its economic development served the long-term interests of the United States, overall, they were also very much in the interests of Japan as well, and many Japanese supported this.

The U.S. occupation of Japan can be divided into two periods according to the nature of the occupation policy. The first half was a period during which the United States demanded thorough democratization and demilitarization of Japan. The system under the Constitution of Japan, which was adopted in 1946, symbolizes this. Many Japanese supported this move towards democratization and demilitarization, and there was strong support for the Constitution that had been formulated under U.S. influence. In the background of this lay the continuous development of democracy in Japan since the Meiji Restoration. Democratic values had already taken root deeply among the Japanese people by the 1920s through universal suffrage and Taisho Democracy. Although Japan achieved democracy during the occupation under the guidance of the United States, the United States did not introduce democracy to Japan. Rather, the Japanese people had borrowed U.S. power to recover the democratic values that had been wrested away from them by the military and some politicians in the 1930s.

However, that occupation policy changed with the advent of the global Cold War. In the second half of the occupation, the main emphasis of the U.S. policy was placed on nurturing Japan as a member of the Western camp supporting the containment policy of the United States by assisting Japan’s economic reconstruction. The emergence of the Cold War, which was a shift in the international environment, greatly changed the relationship between the United States and its former enemies including Japan. As the United States was trying to

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4 See end of 2(2)
create as many allies as possible and to seek their cooperation in containing the Soviet Union, Japan achieving economic recovery as a democratic state and becoming a powerful ally of the United States in the international community appeared very attractive. The U.S. strategy of bringing Japan into its camp as an independent country became reality with the coming into effect of the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in 1952. Freed from the yoke of the occupation and its independence regained, Japan ended up building an alliance with the United States, a country against which it had fought a brutal war only seven years earlier. The Japan-U.S. alliance enabled Japan, which had felt anxiety over its national security with only light armaments, to pursue economic development, while giving the United States a platform for maintaining its military influence that it desired in East Asia in the Cold War. Needing the strong economic power of Japan, the United States focused on Japanese reconstruction; it did not seek reparations at the San Francisco Peace Conference, and it gave powerful support to the reentry of Japan into the international trade system by such means as supporting its membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1955. As such, Japan and the United States built an interdependent relationship in which one was strongly in need of the other in terms of the security and economic aspects, while it was not necessarily an equal relationship.

This shift in the occupation policy of the United States was very drastic, and affected Japan domestically. It also left two afterimages of U.S. policy towards Japan, which in turn had a major effect on the perspectives of the other Asian countries on Japan.

(b) Deepening the Alliance
Having built an alliance in which both countries very much needed each other only seven years after the end of the war, Japan and the United States further deepened this relationship in the 1960s. The revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty that Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi carried out in 1960 elevated Japan-US Alliance from what had been a one-sided relationship to a more reciprocal and sturdy one. The Treaty had obligated Japan to allow the United States to use military bases in Japan, but it had not obligated the United States to defend Japan. When Japan sought to change this, the initial U.S. response was cold. However, recognizing the importance of the long-term stability of the bilateral relationship, the United States unexpectedly came to agree to the revision of the Treaty at a considerably early stage, only a brief eight years after it had come into effect in 1952.

The revision of the Treaty ignited a very fierce movement in opposition in Japan, and the Kishi Cabinet wound up resigning as the result. Paradoxically, however, this headwind for the bilateral relationship created an opportunity to further broaden the scope of the Japan-U.S. relationship. Having seen the anti-Security Treaty revision movement in Japan, President John F. Kennedy appointed Edwin Reischauer, a Japanologist who had suggested a need for a deeper dialogue with Japan, as Ambassador to Japan, and launched the United States-Japan Conference on Cultural and Educational Interchange (CULCON) with Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda. The initiative by President Kennedy and Prime Minister Ikeda
deepened the relationship by broadening the scope of the Japan-U.S. relationship, which until then had been limited almost exclusively to security and economic matters, and built the basis for bilateral grassroots exchanges that form the foundations of the Japan-U.S. relationship today.

The United States was also initially reluctant about the reversion of Okinawa, one of the most serious problems pending between the two countries at that time, due to the United States’ strong recognition of the strategic importance of the islands. The fact that Okinawa remained under U.S. occupation was perceived as a symbol, which left people with an impression that the relationship between Japan and the United States was not an alliance but rather a relationship of the defeated and the victor, respectively. Meanwhile, the importance of Okinawa to the United States had ever increased since the outbreak of the Vietnam War in 1960. As the war fell deeper into a quagmire, the reversion of Okinawa appeared to be a matter for a distant future. But just then, in 1967, Prime Minister Eisaku Sato visited the United States and succeeded in inserting in inserting in the Joint Statement with President Lyndon Johnson words to the effect that an agreement should be reached “within a few years” on a date satisfactory to both sides for the reversion of Okinawa. Furthermore, in 1969, Prime Minister Sato and President Richard Nixon agreed on the reversion of Okinawa to Japan in 1972. It goes without saying that the tenacious negotiating posture of the Sato administration was behind this outcome, but so was the fact that the United States came to decide that the reversion of Okinawa was essential to the stability of the Japan-U.S. relationship from a mid to long-term perspective.

(c) Tensions in the Japan-U.S. Relationship

Although Japan and the United States had steadily advanced the foundation of the bilateral relationship, they persistently faced difficulties in the 1970s. In July 1971, Richard Nixon, who had assumed the presidency in 1969, announced his visit to China without giving prior notice to Japan, and visited China in 1972. This, together with his announcement the following month to cancel the convertibility of the dollar to gold, placed the heretofore steady Japan-U.S. relationship under stress. It was around this time as well that the United States began seeing Japan, which had become a major economic power by then, as a rival. The United States also began to feel dissatisfaction with Japan, which persistently continued its effort to increase exports while protecting its domestic market, despite the fact that Japan was already threatening American superiority in several sectors of the global market.

Furthermore, the United States was beginning to recognize Japan as a country that had no intention of taking its responsibilities in international politics commensurate with its economic power. Although Japan continued to faithfully fulfill its obligations under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty to provide military bases for the United States, the United States had become frustrated with the paucity of the former’s contribution on the security front. Thus, it was also during the 1970s that the United States began demanding explicitly that Japan increase its defense expenditures.
From the end of the 1970s on, in the wake of the Second Oil Crisis, Japanese export of fuel-efficient cars to the United States surged, which caused the intensification of the economic friction between Japan and the United States with automobiles at the core. Indeed, the economic friction became a major challenge to Japan-U.S. relations throughout the 1980s. The friction exacerbated at that time against the backdrop of the launch of Perestroika in the Soviet Union in the mid-1980s, making it less of a threat to the United States, and therefore the United States had less need to give consideration to the relationship with Japan. Anti-Japan sentiments swelled in the United States to the extent that in the 1980s, though temporarily, there was even a public opinion poll which nailed Japan as the greatest threat to the United States.

While friction kept cropping up frequently with regard to economic issues and frustration mounted in the United States with regard to the level of Japanese contributions on the security front, the foundations of the Japan-U.S. alliance had been supported by the ties between the two as part of the Western alliance confronting the Eastern bloc in the Cold War. However, as the Cold War came to an end with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, there was growing concern about the coming of a great challenge to the Japan-U.S. relationship.

(d) The Evolution of the Japan-U.S. Alliance towards a Relationship for Global Cooperation

The tensions that began in the 1970s, however, did not reach the point to shake the foundations of the Japan-U.S. relationship. Since East Asia remained a region of high uncertainty even after the end of the Cold War, having Japan within such a region as an ally and being able to use military bases there continued to be highly attractive to the United States. The mid-1980s saw the golden age of Japan-U.S. security cooperation in the “Ron-Yasu relationship” between Prime Minister Nakasone and President Ronald Regan. The demise of the Cold War had led some people to adopt the view that the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty was no longer necessary, but given the threat from North Korea, both Japan and the United States did not change the policy of firmly maintaining the Japan-U.S. Alliance in the post-Cold War world. In 1996, Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto and President Bill Clinton announced the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security, which led to the new Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation the following year, further strengthening the Alliance. In addition, the economic situation of the United States took a turn for the better in the 1990s and Japanese business moved into the United States in significant numbers. Consequently, from the US perspective, Japan changed from an economic threat to an indispensable partner for its own maintenance and development.

Around this time, Japan’s security policy was undergoing major changes. Japan had made extremely limited international contributions in the area of security up to this point, and the official development assistance (ODA) had been used to make up for shortcomings. However, this reliance on ODA had reached its limits with the burst of the bubble economy. Moreover, Japan was deeply shocked by the fact that it received little appreciation from the international community despite making a massive financial contribution to the Gulf War
efforts. Under such circumstances, understanding was enhanced in Japan of the need to make international contributions on the security front, and Japan embarked on its course of proactive contribution to peace with the dispatch of minesweepers to the Persian Gulf after the Gulf War, participation in UN peacekeeping operation (PKO) activities in Cambodia and so on, a course that continues to this day.5

The United States greatly welcomed the change in Japan’s security policy. There was nothing inevitable about the robust Japan-U.S. Alliance under Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and President George W. Bush between 2001 and 2006. Having increased its international contributions on the security front, Japan supported the U.S. fight against terrorism after the simultaneous multiple terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001 with refueling operations in the Indian Ocean and other means, and also dispatched Self-Defense Force personnel to Iraq to participate in the reconstruction efforts there. It was the orientation towards proactively contributing to international peace that Japan had continuously presented and the new form of the Japan-U.S. alliance, where Japan and the United States would work together to tackle global security issues, that the United States and President Bush valued highly.

(2) 70 Years of Reconciliation with Australia and Europe
(a) Deeply Rooted Anti-Japanese Sentiment
Since Europe was a central player in World War I and deeply felt the suffering of that war, it led the efforts to set a major trend toward the prevention of war in the international community before World War II through the 1919 Covenant of the League of Nations and the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact (the General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy) in 1928. This trend toward the outlawry of war through the League of Nations and the Kellogg-Briand Pact was hit by a serious blow from the Manchurian Incident of 1931. The destruction of the peaceful order by Japan was a huge shock for the United Kingdom, France, and the other European countries, as can be seen in the statement by UK historian E. H. Carr that “Japan’s conquest of Manchuria was one of the most important historical landmark since the end of World War I.”

In the process of Japan expanding its supremacy in Asia, the European countries lost their colonies and many of their own countries’ citizens had been taken prisoner, so antagonism towards Japan became a sentiment widely shared among their citizens. In Europe, this sentiment was the strongest in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, as they lost many of their own citizens in the war with Japan. The situation was the same in Australia, which had fought Japan in the Asia-Pacific region, and just like Europe, many of its citizens had been taken prisoner. Australia and Europe were particularly shocked by the brutal treatment of prisoners by Japan during wartime. During World War II, the death rate on the battlefields on the European front lines and the death rate of British prisoners in Germany and Italy were both 5%, but the death rate of people who became prisoners of the Japanese

5 See 2(1)(d)
Army recorded at 25%, a much higher figure. The treatment of prisoners by Japan, which caused strong indignation among the people of Australia and Europe, remained a major obstacle to reconciliation between Japan and these countries for a long time after the war.

In the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the state of war between Australia and the countries of Western Europe on one side and Japan on the other was terminated, and the problem of the prisoners for Japan was also resolved legally under Article 16 of the Treaty which stipulated payment to prisoners. Based on that clause, Japan paid a total amount of approximately 5.9 billion yen to approximately 200,000 former prisoners from 14 countries including Australia and European countries, but the payments were minor compared to the cruel experiences they had gone through. For example, the amount received by individual prisoners in the United Kingdom averaged no more than 76.5 pounds. This prisoner problem cast a long shadow over the subsequent relationships between Japan and the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Australia. They concluded the San Francisco Peace Treaty, but hatred and antagonism toward Japan remained deep-rooted in Australia and Europe. The governments of each country were fully aware of the fact that the problem of the prisoners had been resolved between governments under the treaty, but among the former prisoners who retained memories of their tragic experiences during World War II and their families, the sentiment that Japan had not sufficiently expressed remorse over or indemnified for its past conduct strongly remained. When Emperor Showa visited Europe in 1971, he was confronted with strong protests from some people, in particular war veterans, in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. In 1993, former prisoners’ organizations in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands filed lawsuits against Japan demanding individual compensation. When the reigning Emperor visited the United Kingdom in 1998, some war veterans staged protests. As these examples showed, hard feelings toward Japan in these countries continued until the second half of the 1990s.

(b) The Government and the Private Individuals Working Together for Reconciliation
In this way, the relationship between Australia, United Kingdom, and Netherlands and Japan continued to be tough for many years, but major progress has been seen over the past 20 years. Against the background of the issue of compensation having been resolved by the treaty, the question of how to treat compensation for individual victims is an extremely difficult problem as can be seen in current Japan-South Korea relations. The action that Japan has taken with Australia, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands has been the government providing as much support as possible for private sector’s assistance to the war victims.

In relations with the United Kingdom, various private efforts began in the 1980s such as the invitation of former prisoners to Japan, pilgrimages to cemeteries in Southeast Asia, and memorial services in the Yokohama British Commonwealth War Cemetery. The Government of Japan was uninterested in and unaccommodating of these activities toward reconciliation by private sector until the 1980s, but it began to actively support these activities in the first half of the 1990s and finally, the Government of Japan came to offer full support
for the activities by private sector for reconciliation between Japan and the United Kingdom. The government’s efforts toward reconciliation subsequently led to the 1994 Peace, Friendship, and Exchange Initiative announced in the Murayama Statement. This initiative disbursed about 90.0 billion yen over 10 years and organized a variety of exchanges and historical researcher exchanges with Australia, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and other countries, and played a major role in the improvement of the image of Japan in these countries.

In relations with the Netherlands, there was also the problem of comfort women in addition to the problem of the war prisoners. Through the Asian Women’s Fund project, the victims received medical and welfare support funded out of the government budget and a letter of apology from the prime minister. Partly due to the existence of the comfort women problem, the Netherlands was a country in which even stronger anti-Japanese sentiment existed than in the United Kingdom, but the sincere letters of apology from successive prime ministers and the support projects for the former victims obtained the understanding of the Government of the Netherlands, and led to a positive evaluation within that country.

Regarding Australia, immediately after the end of the war, the country held an extremely critical view of Japan. Nonetheless, Prime Minister Robert G. Menzies said, “Hostility to Japan must go. It is better to hope than always to remember,” and concluded the Agreement on Commerce between Japan and the Commonwealth of Australia with Prime Minister Kishi in 1957. Since then, exchanges between the two countries have been extremely vigorous, particularly in the economic sphere, and the image of Japan inside Australia has improved. Japan is a major export destination for natural resources of Australia, and Japanese companies are investing and entering the market in Australia. So as a consequence now, both countries are indispensable to each other.

(3) Evaluation of the 70 Years of Reconciliation with the United States, Australia, and Europe

World War II was the most brutal war that the human race has experienced to date, and citizens of each country that became involved in the war experienced deep suffering which cannot be extinguished in a short time. Reconciliation after such a war is not easy, and perhaps full reconciliation may be difficult to begin with. Actually in Japan, there are citizens who are discontent about the Great Tokyo Air Raid, the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the treatment of people of Japanese descent, and the nature of the occupation by the United States, and there are people in the United States, Australia, and Europe who are discontent with Japan about the treatment of the war prisoners. Nonetheless, even if full reconciliation is impossible, we can conclude that Japan and the United States, Australia, and Europe have achieved a reconciliation supported even at the citizen level over the 70 years since the war.

For countries that fought the war, there are two options after the war is over. The first is a path of continuing to criticize the other country about the past and continuing to hate it. And the other is a path of reconciling and placing importance on cooperation toward the
future. Japan and the United States, Australia, and Europe chose the second path. Why were Japan and these countries able to achieve reconciliation and travel the path of cooperation with enemies with whom they had waged bloody battles? What is the difference from those countries that chose the first path in their relations with Japan and did not travel the path of reconciliation? The answer is that both the perpetrators and the victims patiently endeavored to build future-oriented relations. It is a major premise that the perpetrators compensate the victims with a sincere attitude, but it is also important for the victims to accept these feelings of the perpetrators with a heart of tolerance. This has been demonstrated not only by relations between Japan and the United States, Australia, and Europe but also by the fact that France was magnanimous in Germany-France relations and Israel was magnanimous in Germany-Israel relations, each in their own way, and they were positive and forward-looking about improving their relations with Germany, leading to the good relations they have today.

Relations between Japan and the United States, Australia, and Europe today are robust ones bound together by our mutual trust, respect, shared values, mutual understanding, and exposure to each other’s cultures. In particular, we can conclude that the fact that Japan and the United States, two countries that fought an all-out war for four years from 1941, were able to form a robust and good alliance within a short period of time, testifies that our bilateral relations achieved a rare success in the history of the world. This is of great historical significance. However, as stated above, it is still difficult to conclude that full reconciliation has been achieved with respect to World War II, and there are still people in the United States, Australia, and Europe who think that Japan has not yet apologized sufficiently. We should take pride in the history of reconciliation with these countries over the past 70 years, but at the same time, we must not forget the spirit of consideration for others and humility.
4. How did Japan pursue reconciliation with China, the Republic of Korea and other Asian countries in the 70 years after the war?

(1) 70 Years of Reconciliation with China  
(a) From the End of the War to Normalization of Diplomatic Relations  

China’s stance on Japan’s responsibility for the war has been consistently that of the “military-civilian dualism” since the end of World War II up until now. The idea is that China lays the onus of Japan’s war responsibility on a select group of militarists and does not hold Japanese civilians and ordinary soldiers responsible. The Chinese government took a stern attitude toward Japan in the International Military Tribunal for the Far East and the occupation policy on Japan, but allowed ordinary Japanese soldiers remaining in China after the war to leave for Japan after disarming them, along with civilians.  

Soon after the end of the war, when the People’s Republic of China was established in October 1949 and the Republic of China relocated to Taiwan, the two Chinese governments came to coexist in the world. Partly due to the request from the United States, Japan concluded the Treaty of Peace with the Republic of China in April 1952 and established diplomatic relations. The Republic of China waived reparations claims, and President Chiang Kai-shek announced his policy of “returning virtue for malice” toward Japan, based on the idea of “military-civilian dualism.” Chiang Kai-shek’s stance on Japan, as expressed by the term “returning virtue for malice (yi de bao yuan)” assumed the role of preventing the history issue from emerging in subsequent relations between Japan and the Republic of China. On the other hand, Taiwan was placed under martial law, with the constitution suspended until 1987. Chiang Kai-shek’s peace with Japan was thus not something that was achieved on the basis of consensus among its people. Personal exchanges between Japan and the Republic of China were also limited in the 1950s and the 1960s. While Japan and the Republic of China achieved peace in terms of diplomatic relations, there was no major breakthrough in reconciliation between the peoples of Japan and the Republic of China.  

Meanwhile, turning to the People’s Republic of China, the one-party rule by the Communist Party of China was established by the mid-1950s, and the Communist Party introduced history education which was harsh on Japan, or so-called anti-Japanese education. However, like Chiang Kai-shek, Chairman Mao Zedong, in line with “military-civilian dualism,” held a select group of militarists responsible for Japan’s war against China, and made it clear that Japanese people were their victims. Despite Japan’s establishment of diplomatic ties with the Republic of China, instead of with the People’s Republic of China, lying behind Mao Zedong’s call for “military-civilian dualism” toward Japan were his intentions to draw Japanese people, particularly the civilian population, to China and push them toward creating a movement to recognize the People’s Republic of China in due course. He also had an intention to politically neutralize Japan in Asia by working with anti-American activists and reformists within Japan. Under this policy set out by Mao Zedong, there were some exchanges, centering on private-sector trade, among the business...
community and people working for Japan-China friendship in the 1950s and the 1960s between Japan and the People’s Republic of China, even in the absence of official diplomatic ties.

Relations between Japan and the two Chinas underwent significant changes from the latter half of the 1960s to the first half of the 1970s. After the Sino-Soviet border conflict arose over the Zhenbao Island in 1969, the People’s Republic of China, developing a sense of crisis with relations with the Soviet Union, made a sudden approach to the United States. After the People’s Republic of China gained a right to representation to the United Nations in 1971, Japan and the People’s Republic of China moved in earnest toward diplomatic normalization. U.S. President Richard Nixon made a visit to the People’s Republic of China in February 1972. Seven months later, in September 1972, Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka visited China and agreed to normalize diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China, severing diplomatic ties with the Republic of China.

(b) From Normalization of Diplomatic Relations to the Present
In September 1972, Japan and the People’s Republic of China announced the Joint Communique of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People’s Republic of China, and normalized their diplomatic relations. In the Joint Communique, Japan stated that “The Japanese side is keenly conscious of the responsibility for the serious damage that Japan caused in the past to the Chinese people through war, and deeply reproaches itself.” In response, the Government of the People's Republic of China stated that it “declares that in the interest of the friendship between the Chinese and the Japanese peoples, it renounces its demand for war reparation from Japan.” Turning to China in the 1970s, the Cultural Revolution came to a close in 1976, and Deng Xiaoping assumed control and launched the reform and open-door policies in 1978. Then in 1978, Deng Xiaoping became China’s first top government leader to visit Japan and the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People’s Republic of China was concluded. The treaty, which stated that Japan and China “confirm that...they shall in their mutual relations settle all disputes by peaceful means and shall refrain from the use or threat of force,” was an epoch-making one that committed the two countries that fought each other in World War II, to the building of a truly peaceful relationship. Amid these developments toward Japan-China friendship, Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira visited China in 1979, and subsequently Japan’s economic cooperation with China, worth as much as 3 trillion yen in total, was launched. With this economic cooperation at the core, Japan became an indispensable country for China’s economic development in the 1980s. With Deng Xiaoping regarding Japan as China’s economic mentor, the importance of Japan rapidly increased in China for both the government and its people.

Thus, China increasingly deepened its reliance on Japan economically. However, Deng Xiaoping, while striving to enhance economic relations with Japan, came to underscore history, fearing that China’s young people would grow up without knowing what Japan had done in the past and forget history. This move strengthened after the history textbook issue
occurred in 1982. It was in 1985 that the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall was constructed, and in 1987 that the Museum of Commemorating the Victory of Chinese People’s Resistance against Japan in Lugouqiao (the Marco Polo Bridge) was constructed. The basis of anti-Japanese education in China, which still continues now, was laid during this period under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping. While anti-Japanese sentiments gradually grew stronger among Chinese people along with the increased consciousness of history in response to anti-Japanese education, amicable relations in the economic field offset the history issue, and public sentiments remained relatively favorable in both Japan and China in the 1980s. Though the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989 significantly impaired Japanese people’s sentiments toward China, Japan paid extra consideration to China even after the Tiananmen Square incident, with the Government of Japan swiftly lifting economic sanctions against China in the early 1990s and His Majesty the Emperor visiting China in 1992.

As shown by His Majesty the Emperor’s visit to China in 1992, Japan-China relations remained relatively favorable until the first half of the 1990s, despite a variety of twists and turns. However, the relations gradually changed after Jiang Zemin became president in 1993. As the Tiananmen Square incident occurred in 1989 and the Soviet Union and other socialist countries disappeared one after another from around the world in the wake of the end to the Cold War from the latter half of the 1980s to the early 1990s, a compelling question for the Communist Party of China was how to sustain the socialist system under the single-party rule. Against this backdrop, patriotic education emerged as a means of reinforcing the legitimacy of the Communist Party. The Communist Party of China provided more vigorous patriotic education than that which was provided under Deng Xiaoping, and the history with Japan, in particular, came to occupy a central position in patriotic education.

In Japan during this period, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was driven out of government for the first time, shaking up the 1955 system. In 1995, 50 years after the end of the war, Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama issued a statement, in which he acknowledged that Japan, “through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations,” and expressed “my feelings of deep remorse and state my heartfelt apology.” While Japan showed its humble attitude toward history, China, which was strengthening patriotic education, did not respond favorably to Japan’s attitude at that point in time. In the 1990s, China’s economy grew, and China’s economic dependence on Japan was declining.

Also, a significant change occurred in Taiwan during this period. In Taiwan, the first-ever presidential election was held in 1996 and Lee Teng-hui became the first democratically elected president. There had been active exchanges between Japan and Taiwan, mainly in the economic field up until then. Taiwan’s democratization significantly improved Japan’s consciousness of Taiwan, and exchanges between Japan and Taiwan became rapidly closer thereafter with the help of Taiwan’s favorable feelings toward Japan.

Anti-Japanese sentiments that mounted from the second half of the 1990s culminated in large-scale anti-Japanese demonstrations in China in 2005, triggered by Prime Minister
Koizumi’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine and the Japan-China confrontation over the reform of the United Nations Security Council, leaving big scars in Japan-China relations. However, the demonstrations gave rise to the momentum that something must be done for bilateral relations on both sides of Japan and China. In 2006, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Chinese President Hu Jintao defined bilateral relations as a mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests, and agreed to promote such a relationship. The confrontation between Japan and China over the perception of history that continued from the early 1990s came to a pause, at least tentatively, with the confirmation of this mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests. In fact, when Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited Japan in April 2007, he made it clear in his speech before the Japanese Diet that China continues to uphold “military-civilian dualism” and said that the Japanese Government and leaders have on many occasions “admitted that Japan had committed aggression and expressed deep remorse and apology to the victimized countries,” and “The Chinese Government and people appreciate the position they have taken.” On Japan’s path to peaceful development in the postwar period, he also said, “As a friendly neighbor of Japan, the Chinese people support the Japanese people in their continued pursuit of peaceful development.” This was China’s official response to the Murayama Statement and the 2005 Koizumi Statement, and can be interpreted as a juncture in Japan-China dialogue over the war and reconciliation. While the history issue remains a major concern in the present Japan-China relations, incumbent President Xi Jinping has clearly committed himself to the continuation of mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests between Japan and China.

(c) Evaluation of the 70 Years of Reconciliation with China
Looking back on the 70 years after the end of World War II, we can view them as the 70 years during which both Japan and China showed their attitudes toward reconciliation but their intentions failed to coincide fully.

In the 1950s right after the end of the war as well as in the 1960s, when Chiang Kai-shek displayed the spirit of “returning virtue for malice (yi de bao yuan)” and Mao Zedong articulated the idea of “military-civilian dualism,” discussions also gathered steam in Japan about Japan’s responsibility for the war as well as its remorse over the war. However, since Japan did not have diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China then, and personal exchanges with the Republic of China were only limited, reconciliation did not move forward in a manner where peoples from both sides interacted with each other. Conversely, by the time a measure of freedom of speech was achieved in China and democratization was achieved in Taiwan, discussions in Japan on remorse over the war and its war responsibility have receded than before. It was during this period that private-sector relations broadened. The years during which Deng Xiaoping regarded Japan as China’s economic mentor and Japan-China relations rapidly became closer, led by their economic ties in the 1980s, provided the two countries with an ideal opportunity to move forward
toward reconciliation. At the same time, however, Deng Xiaoping made a decision to emphasize history between the two countries, preventing them from achieving significant progress in reconciliation. After the Tiananmen Square incident, Japan moved to forestall China’s isolation in the international community and announced the Murayama Statement on the 50th anniversary of the end of the war. Nonetheless, these efforts on the Japanese side happened to overlap the years of Jiang Zemin, when China enhanced its patriotic education as a means of reinforcing the legitimacy of the Communist Party after the Cold War.

While factors such as trends of the times unfortunately prevented Japanese and Chinese initiatives for reconciliation from falling into line, this does not mean that the efforts made so far on both sides came to nothing. The “Peace, Friendship, and Exchange Initiative” carried out by the Murayama administration on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the end of the war did help expand personal exchanges between the two countries. The Japan Center for Asian Historical Records, established under the initiative, is still widely utilized by researchers of both countries who wish to deepen their understanding of history. Furthermore, Japan and China conducted a joint history research between 2006 and 2010.

China has maintained “military-civilian dualism” after the end of the war. As Premier Wen Jiabao stated in his speech before the Japanese Diet in 2007, China made clear its stance of appreciating Japan’s remorse and apology over the war, which was expressed in the Murayama Statement and the Koizumi Statement.

The mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests confirmed by Prime Minister Abe and President Hu Jintao in 2006 called for the promotion of personal exchanges between the two countries. In addition, President Xi Jinping clearly stated he would inherit and promote these principles. Going forward, it will become necessary to undertake work to move toward reconciliation with China by making exchanges at all levels much more active than before, on the basis of remorse over the past and reclosing the buttons done up incorrectly in the past.

(2) 70 Years of Reconciliation with the Republic of Korea
(a) From the End of the War to Normalization of Diplomatic Relations
Japan’s colonial rule over the Republic of Korea for 35 years from 1910 on to the end of the war eased somewhat in the 1920s and achieved a measure of economic growth there, but became relentless from the latter half of the 1930s. It was essential for the Republic of Korea, which had been under Japanese colonial rule, to deny and overcome prewar Japan in order to achieve its psychological independence. The Republic of Korea, which gained independence in 1948, tried to face Japan by participating in the San Francisco Peace Conference as a victorious nation. However, it was not allowed to participate in the peace conference, and as a consequence, the Republic of Korea started on the postwar path with uneasy national sentiments. Further complicating the position of the Republic of Korea was the fact that it had to cooperate with Japan as a member of the Western alliance in the international situation during the Cold War. On the same Korean Peninsula, North Korea, a
member of the Eastern bloc, was able to take a clear-cut stance of rejecting Japan. In contrast, the Republic of Korea was torn by a dilemma: while rationally Japan was a country it had to work with in the international politics, it was also a country which should be denied and overcome emotionally. The Republic of Korea’s policy toward Japan, it can be said, has wavered between this reason and sentiment over the 70 years after the end of the war.

Japan and the Republic of Korea normalized their diplomatic relations after seven plenary rounds of negotiations that took as long as 14 years since preliminary negotiations were commenced in 1951. For the Republic of Korea, with the intersecting reason and emotion in its policy toward Japan, the normalization of diplomatic ties in 1965 was a rational decision by the government led by President Park Chung-hee. Under the Agreement on the Settlement of Problems Concerning Property and Claims and on the Economic Cooperation between Japan and the Republic of Korea Japan provided the Park administration with its economic cooperation worth $500 million ($300 million in grant aid and $200 million in loan aid), which amounted to approximately one year and a half of the Republic of Korea’s national budget then. Article II of the Agreement states that the Contracting Parties confirm that the problem concerning property, rights and interests between the two countries “is settled completely and finally.”

(b) From Normalization of Diplomatic Relations to the Present
In the relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea while President Park Chung Hee was in office, there were incidents that aroused national sentiments of the Korean people, such as the abduction of Kim Dae-jung and an assassination attempt on President Park Chung-hee. Nonetheless, Japan-Republic of Korea relations stayed relatively stable under the realistic approach taken by President Park, who gave much weight to cooperation between Japan and the Republic of Korea under the Cold War. Even after the assassination of President Park Chung-hee, relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea went into the period for the development of stable cooperative ties from the latter half of the 1970s to the 1980s. In the 1980s in particular, Prime Minister Nakasone, who proactively sought to strengthen relations between the two countries, agreed with President Chun Doo-hwan on Japan’s economic cooperation worth $4 billion. The subsequent visit to Japan by President Chun Doo-hwan helped relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea to move forward significantly. The progress in the bilateral relations in this period can be partly explained by the fact that in the international situation under the Cold War, both Japan and the Republic of Korea overcame a variety of difficulties and reached rational judgment.

The Republic of Korea achieved democratization in 1987 and successfully hosted the Seoul Olympics in 1988, raising its status in the international community with its economic growth. Democratization and the disappearance of the authoritarian political system removed obstacles to rethinking its relations with Japan emotionally instead of with reason. During this period, the comfort women issue attracted attention. Japan announced the Kono Statement and the Murayama Statement, and carried out projects by the Asian Women’s
Fund (AWF) for former Korean comfort women from the early 1990s to the mid-1990s, stepping up efforts to reduce the distance between Japan and the Republic of Korea. Subsequently, Kim Dae-jung, who assumed the presidency in 1998, and Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi announced the “Japan-Republic of Korea Joint Declaration: A New Japan-Republic of Korea Partnership towards the Twenty-first Century,” in which they agreed that the two countries would build a future-oriented relationship and raise bilateral relations to a higher dimension on this basis. In the Japan-Republic of Korea partnership declaration, Prime Minister Obuchi, “looking back on the relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea during this century, regarded in a spirit of humility the fact of history that Japan caused, during a certain period in the past, tremendous damage and suffering to the people of the Republic of Korea through its colonial rule, and expressed his deep remorse and heartfelt apology for this fact.” In response, President Kim “accepted with sincerity this statement of Prime Minister Obuchi’s recognition of history and expressed his appreciation for it. He also expressed his view that the present calls upon both countries to overcome their unfortunate history and to build a future-oriented relationship based on reconciliation as well as good-neighborly and friendly cooperation.”

However, the favorable relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea went through a sea change under the administration of President Roh Moo-hyun, who succeeded Kim Dae-jung. A large number of officials in the Roh administration were from the “386 Generation.” People of the “386 Generation,” who were born in the 1960s, graduated from university in the 1980s and were in their 30s in the 1990s, were the generation who rebelled greatly against the authoritarian government that gave much weight to reason and oppressed domestic emotions in the 1980s. Once within the Roh administration, they pursued extremely anti-Japanese ideas. At first, President Roh appeared rational in the early years of his presidency, agreeing with Prime Minister Koizumi on the shuttle diplomacy between the top government leaders. However, placed under pressure from the public opinion, President Roh came to demand apology and remorse from Japan, and also referred to the necessity of compensation in his speech in March 2005 at the ceremony to commemorate the March First independence movement. The administration of President Roh Moo-hyun changed its policy toward Japan, partly because the “386 Generation” laid out anti-Japanese arguments within the administration but there was also an aspect of the developments in Japan around that time arousing public sentiments in the Republic of Korea. Furthermore, while exchanges between peoples of Japan and the Republic of Korea increased through the 2002 FIFA World Cup and the Korean boom in Japan, frustration against each other also built up among both Japanese and Korean peoples. When mutual exchanges initially increased, Korean people, who had expected the Japanese to have the same ideas as theirs, felt betrayed and even felt resentment as their differences in sensitivity became apparent over time about the history issue and various other issues. However, these were not one-way feelings that only the Koreans had toward the Japanese. Japanese people, who similarly had expected Korean people to have the same ideas, increased their grievances against the Koreans upon seeing them impassively
attempt to overturn the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea and being astonished by the difference in the thinking about the rule of law.

When the administration of President Lee Myung-bak was installed as the first conservative government in 10 years in 2008, Japan hoped that President Lee would opt for a policy based on reason toward Japan and work to improve bilateral relations harmed under the administration of President Roh Moo-hyun. In his early years in office, President Lee appeared poised to manage relations with Japan rationally, as he sought to promote stronger ties with Japan and the United States and agreed to the launch of the Joint History Research by Japan and the Republic of Korea (the Second Phase (the First Phase was 2002-2005)). However, after the Constitutional Court of Korea ruled in August 2011 that the government of the Republic of Korea’s failure to negotiate with Japan on the comfort women issue was unconstitutional, President Lee’s policy toward Japan made an about-face, and he came to deal with Japan by bringing national sentiments to the fore. At the Japan-Republic of Korea summit meeting in December 2011, President Lee demanded that Japan show sincerity on the comfort women issue. In August 2012, he landed on Takeshima, and in the last days of the administration of President Lee, Japan-Republic of Korea relations slipped into its worst shape ever. While Japan had no intention on its side to compound the Takeshima issue, President Lee’s unilateral actions ended up hardening Japan’s attitude.

Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea deteriorated in the latter half of the administration of President Lee Myung-bak, and there have been no signs of improvement in bilateral relations even after the change of administration in the Republic of Korea to that of President Park Geun-hye. Instead of moving to mend bilateral relations impaired under the administration of President Lee Myung-bak, President Park is pushing ahead with the emotion-based diplomacy toward Japan from the outset of her administration, and making it clear that she does not intend to seek any progress in bilateral relations unless Japan compromises on the recognition of history. While her two predecessors, Presidents Roh Moo-hyun and Lee Myung-bak, tried to promote cooperative relations with Japan based on reason at least in the early years in office, President Park brought emotions to the fore from the outset of her presidency and is regarded as a president with the harshest attitude toward Japan. Partly explaining her attitude is her personal attachment to the comfort women issue and the significant domestic influence of anti-Japanese organizations, such as the Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan. In addition, it can be pointed out that, with the importance of China gaining in the Republic of Korea, the importance of cooperation with Japan in international politics is dwindling. The importance of China increased against the backdrop of the Republic of Korea’s rising economic reliance on China as well as the rising expectations on China in the Korean Peninsula unification issue.

(c) Evaluation of the 70 Years of Reconciliation with the Republic of Korea

Looking back on the 70 years after the end of the war, one can see that while the rational thinking of the Republic of Korea’s view of Japan provided a boost to realistic cooperative
relations with Japan, emotions that heightened the negative historical recognition of Japan proved to be an obstacle to the progress in bilateral relations. It can be said that the answer to the question of what we must do to accomplish yet-to-be-achieved reconciliation with the Republic of Korea is for Japan to work on both the reason and emotions of the Republic of Korea.

In terms of the approach to reason, it is necessary to reconfirm why favorable relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea are necessary for both Japan and the Republic of Korea. The need for this approach is also apparent in view of the current situation where the administration of President Park finds no significance in dealing with Japan rationally, as it increased reliance on China and downgraded Japan. In order to do this, it is necessary to have repeated dialogue repeatedly with the Republic of Korea on the importance of each other, not only by focusing on aspects that the two countries are neighbors who share values such as freedom, democracy and market economy, but also by using specific examples that demonstrate how bilateral economic ties and cooperation between Japan and the Republic of Korea in the security area of the Asia-Pacific region are important for the prosperity and stability of the region as well as the entire world. President Park’s hardline stance toward Japan is showing some signs of change recently, and dialogue between the business communities of the two countries remains active. Given these developments, it can be said that there is room for expanding intergovernmental dialogue as well.

In terms of the approach to emotions, it is true that particularly in the 1990s, Japan made efforts by announcing the Kono Statement and the Murayama Statement and also through the Asian Women’s Fund. Furthermore, it is also true that the Republic of Korea showed a measure of appreciation when the Japanese side made these efforts. Despite these developments, the negative views of Japan regarding history linger strongly within the Republic of Korea even now, and the government reflects such domestic opinions in its policy toward Japan. Looking back on such developments, it is only natural that regardless of how much effort Japan makes and how much the government of the Republic of Korea at the time appreciates it, there will still be concerns that history may be repeated, in that a future government of the Republic of Korea will deny the past efforts made by Japan. Nonetheless, there would be no hope for progress in bilateral relations if nothing is done to deal with the antipathy toward Japan that still lingers within the Republic of Korea. In the Japan-Republic of Korea Partnership Declaration of 1998, Prime Minister Obuchi expressed his deep remorse for tremendous damage and suffering caused to the people of the Republic of Korea through its colonial rule. In response, President Kim accepted with sincerity this statement of Prime Minister Obuchi’s recognition of history, expressed his appreciation for it, and also expressed his view that the present called upon both countries to overcome their unfortunate history to build a future-oriented relationship based on reconciliation as well as good-neighborly and friendly cooperation. Nevertheless, given that the government of the Republic of Korea subsequently moved “the goalpost” in the history issue, we need to ask the government of the Republic of Korea to think together about a way to accomplish the
lasting reconciliation. It is necessary for the governments of both Japan and the Republic of Korea to get together and consider how to deal with the national sentiments of the people of the Republic of Korea for genuine reconciliation between the two countries, develop measures for reconciliation, and share the responsibility for them.

(3) 70 Years of Reconciliation with Southeast Asia
(a) 70 Years of Reconciliation with Southeast Asia
The period of 10 to 15 years since the end of World War II in 1945 was when many countries gained independence, and momentum for self-determination mounted in Southeast Asia. In Southeast Asia, all the countries except for Thailand had been colonized by Western powers by the end of the 19th century, and were under Japan’s rule during World War II. Therefore, a pressing issue for Southeast Asian countries at the time of their independence was to achieve economic development and become self-reliant both in name and in reality. After the war, the world entered the Cold War, which was fought between the liberal system and the socialist system. In Southeast Asia however, the focal point in the choice of the system was not between communism and democracy, but how to realize nation-building and economic development. Under these circumstances, the developmental dictatorships emerged one after another in Southeast Asia, with these governments leading the nation-building and economic development initiatives in a top-down approach. Many countries in Southeast Asia opted for the path of the top-down nation-building and economic development, including the government of Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat launched in Thailand in 1957, the government of Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore following its independence in 1965, the government of President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines launched in 1965, and the government of President Mohamed Suharto in Indonesia established in 1966. In Indochina, meanwhile, wars continued throughout the Cold War, with the region’s full-fledged economic development starting only after the end of the Cold War.

Japan proceeded with reconciliation with Southeast Asian countries by concluding agreements on reparations or quasi reparations. For Southeast Asian countries that regarded economic development as their top priority at the time, war reparations from Japan and its subsequent economic cooperation were of extremely huge significance and played a major part in reconciliation between Japan and Southeast Asia. In addition, Japanese companies also increased direct investment in and technological transfers to Southeast Asian countries since the 1970s. Their deployment of cross-border production networks furthered the relationship of economic interdependence between Japan and Southeast Asia, and personal exchanges centering on the economic field became active, with reconciliation among peoples of Japan and Southeast Asia also making headway.

In the 1970s, however, there was a backlash against Japan’s economic advances in Southeast Asian countries, leading to anti-Japan demonstrations and anti-Japan rioting during the Southeast Asian tour by Prime Minister Tanaka in 1974. In response to these developments, Prime Minister Fukuda announced the “Fukuda Doctrine” in 1977. The
“Fukuda Doctrine” provided Southeast Asian countries with a great sense of reassurance by pledging that Japan would never become a military power, build “the heart-to-heart relationship of mutual trust” with Southeast Asian countries and contribute to the peace and prosperity of the entire Southeast Asian region. The Japan-ASEAN Summit Meeting, which was launched in 1977 and marked its 17th meeting in 2014, has become what symbolizes that relations between Japan and Southeast Asia have been steadily enhanced since the 1970s.

The Philippines and Indonesia had the issue of comfort women during World War II with Japan. Reconciliation over the issue made significant progress thanks to activities of the Asian Women’s Fund in the 1990s. The atonement money from the Asian Women’s Fund was paid, medical and welfare support projects by the Japanese government were implemented, and letters of apology from the Japanese prime minister were delivered to the victims in the Philippines. Projects to promote social welfare for the elderly were implemented in Indonesia. Through these activities, anti-Japan sentiments caused by the comfort women issue calmed down significantly in these countries.

(b) Evaluation of the 70 Years of Reconciliation with Southeast Asia

In comparison with Japan’s relations with China and the Republic of Korea, relations between Japan and Southeast Asia have been improved and enhanced significantly over the past 70 years. The background to this development is that while Japan was indeed the enemy in the eyes of the peoples of China and the Republic of Korea through their harsh experiences with the war and the colonial rule, Japan was not regarded as the primary enemy in the national narratives of Southeast Asian countries. There were still many people in Southeast Asia who suffered great hardships under Japan’s rule. However, for peoples of Southeast Asian countries who experienced the long years of colonial rule by Western powers, Japan came as the second or third colonial power, and as a consequence all the hardships under the colonial rule and the war were not totally blamed on Japan.

As former Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew once said, “Forgive, but never forget” about Japan’s misdeeds during World War II, Southeast Asian countries do remember that Japan had done terrible things to them during the war, and we must keep this in mind. In the 1930s, Japan tried to build an empire against the mounting movement of self-determination since World War I across the world, and made a fatal mistake in its national policy in clashing with nationalism in Asia and also making an enemy of Britain, the United States, and other Western powers, thereby doing harm to the peoples of Asia.

In Indonesia, there were cases where former Japanese soldiers who remained after the end of the war fought for the country’s independence. Nevertheless we must never forget that not a small number of people in Southeast Asia lost their families and relatives as well as friends and suffered tremendously at the hands of Japan during the war, including the Philippines and Singapore, which suffered a huge number of victims. Currently, Japan and Southeast Asia enjoy very friendly relations, but their experiences are being inherited in their national narratives among the peoples of Southeast Asian countries.
The countries in Southeast Asia are aware that Japan has consistently pursued a peaceful path since the end of the war and contributed to the development of Asian countries, and place much importance on their relations with Japan. Some leaders of Southeast Asian countries often say, “Japan is always there to support us and that is the most important thing.” When the Asian Financial Crisis erupted in the latter half of the 1990s and many Southeast Asian countries were on the verge of collapse, Japan provided massive financial support and made no small contribution to their economic reconstruction. If we are to cite the most recent examples, Indonesian President Joko Widodo chose Japan as the first country to visit in Asia after assuming the presidency. President Aquino of the Philippines, a county that became Japan’s battlefield and suffered a large number of victims during World War II, stated in his address to the Japanese Diet, “The War was devastating for all of us; there was bitterness on all sides for the suffering that occurred. However, from its ashes, the relationship between our peoples was reborn like a phoenix.” We need to further strengthen cooperative relations with Southeast Asia while treasuring the confidence in Japan cultivated in Southeast Asia over the 70 years since the end of the war, and at the same time, face the bitter experiences peoples of Southeast Asia had gone through during the war and kept in their hearts with humility.
5. What is our vision of Asia and the world of the 21st Century, drawing on the lessons learned from the 20th century? What are the contributions that Japan should make?

(1) The Two Universalizations that the World Experienced in the 20th Century
What should Asia and the world be like in the 21st century? And what are the contributions that Japan should make in order to build the best possible Asia and the best possible world?

In order to answer these questions, we looked back at the course of the world and Japan in the 20th century, and pondered the lessons we learned from that. In the 20th century, the world experienced many disturbances of wars including the two World Wars, colonial rule, revolutions, suppression of human rights, and bloc economies. It was based on reflection over this experience that various principles such as peace, rule of law, liberal democracy, respect for human rights, the free trade system, self-determination, and support for the economic development of developing countries came to be widely shared. In this world history, Japan swam against the international tides of the time during the 1930s and the first half of the 1940s to use military force for its expansion in Asia, and created a major cause of World War II. Defeated in this war, Japan felt deep remorse on the process by which it entered into war as well as its various acts during the war. It then achieved prosperity after the war by adhering faithfully to the common principles of international community listed above. All this is explained in Chapter 1 of this Report.

It is clear that this transformation of the rules and values of the international community was an enormous change in the world of the 20th century. However, we have touched little so far on another major change in the 20th century that is crucial when considering our vision for Asia and the world of the 21st century. It is a fact that a major change occurred in the members of the international community over the course of the 20th century.

At the beginning of the 20th century, the world was largely divided into independent countries on the one hand and colonies on the other. Western Europe, the United States, Russia, and Japan had made the world their colonies. Under a set of values that would not be permissible today, the Great Powers attempted to universalize a structure in which advanced countries colonize the “savage” and “barbarous” regions in order to civilize them. However, this trend stopped for a while as the ideal of self-determination emerged from World War I, and received a fatal blow from World War II.

After World War II, the colonies of the victors moved towards independence, such as those that had been promised post-war independence for cooperating with the suzerain powers. The colonial holdings of the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands and others in Southeast Asia also received serious blows as Japan moved in. Although the United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands attempted to restore their colonial rule after the war, they were not able to achieve the goal. Whether or not Japan intended to liberate Asia, it did wind up promoting the independence of the colonies in Asia. Furthermore, after the war, Japan helped
the newly independent countries to stand on their own feet through reparations and then economic cooperation.

At the beginning of the 20th century, the Great Powers ruled their colonies in the name of “civilizing” them and tried to make their own value of imperialism universal. The achievement of independence in the 1950s and 1960s after World War II by the colonies after much suffering, the establishment of the value that self-determination is precious, and the birth of many sovereign states around the world, can be described as the second tide of universalization in the world of 20th century.

The fact that many of the colonies achieved independence by the 1960s led to the establishment of a system in which all countries around the world would participate in the international community with equal rights. Moreover, principles that became the driving force for the prosperity of the international community were peace, rule of law, liberal democracy, respect for human rights, the free trade system, self-determination, and support for the economic development of developing countries. Under such circumstances, it was the United States that championed this set of values in the international community and led the world to prosperity. Japan for its part achieved its own prosperity and contributed to the global peace and prosperity by respecting and promoting these universal principles of the international community in close cooperation with the United States. The peace and prosperity today in many countries of the world including Japan is based on the products of the system created in the second half of the 20th century, and it is crucially important that this trend will be maintained in the 21st century. That said, there are two new trends that have been emerging in the 21st century.

First, the balance of power in the world order is showing some change with the rise of the emerging economies. According to an IMF economic outlook, the G7’s share of the world economy, which was at 66% in 2000, will drop to 45% in 2018, while the share of the emerging economies will rise from 20% to 42% in the same period. China’s share will rise from 4% in 2000 to 14% in 2018, and in contrast, the share of North America and Europe is estimated to drop from 58% to 44% in 2018 and Japan’s share from 15% to 6%. Amid this situation with the changing balance of power, it is considered that the United States is nevertheless likely to continue to lead the world order for the time being and serve as the champion of the set of common values. However, its powers are no longer as overwhelmingly superior to others as before.

The other change is the reality of the lack of progress in the building of stable states in parts of the Middle East and Africa. Activities of various organizations that transcend national borders are on the rise in the regions, and these activities are a source of instability for the entire world. In addition, with the advance of globalization, threats are diversifying in the forms of religious and sectarian conflicts, ethnic conflicts, and various types of terrorism. As a result, there has been an increase in situations that cannot be dealt with based on the
traditional concept of security. These structural changes are occurring in an increasingly fast-moving world driven by explosive population growth and the spreading of information and communication technology that is progressing at an exponential rate. On the other hand, we would also like to turn our eyes to the positive side of diversification. In today’s world, people come together across ethnic, cultural, and religious boundaries, as well as political systems, to interact with each other, and new values and technologies are emerging from these gatherings. While the advance of globalization has seen the diversification of threats, contribution to peace does not remain in the hands of states and international organizations as before either: non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other non-state actors are playing constructive roles through citizen diplomacy, post-conflict reconstruction assistance, and other means. We must cooperate with these non-state actors and contribute to regional stabilization and nation-building.

(3) What should Japan do for the prosperity of the world and Asia?
It is very important for peace and stability of the world and Japan in the 21st century to maintain the international coexistence system of the second half of the 20th century. Meanwhile, given the new trends in the world in the 21st century, Japan will be required to play a different role from the past. Under the circumstances where the United States no longer has overwhelming power and destabilizing factors in the international order are diversifying, Japan needs to contribute more proactively than before to the stability of the international order.

First, we would like to turn our eyes to Asia. As the national power of the United States is declining in relative terms, it will be difficult for the United States to continue to maintain the absolute role that it has played so far for stability in Asia. Under such circumstances, it is sensible to say that Japan should shoulder an even greater responsibility than before for peace and prosperity across Asia as a country which plays a part in the balance of power in this region. There are many countries in the region that share with Japan principles such as peace, rule of law, liberal democracy, respect for human rights, the free trade system, self-determination, and support for the economic development of developing countries. Japan will be required to be willing to lead the establishment of liberal rules and the creation of regional systems by consensus in Asia. When formulating rules, it is important to do so in a manner that all countries concerned in the region find acceptable.

However, as we described in Chapter 4, it cannot be said that reconciliation with China and the Republic of Korea has been fully achieved. Even in Southeast Asian countries, with which Japan achieved reconciliation, there do exist people who harbor complicated feelings towards Japan. There also remain other historical issues. It is important for Japan to continue engaging in steady dialogue with China and the Republic of Korea towards reconciliation, while, at the same time, communicating with Southeast Asian countries with a sense of humility, without forgetting about the past.
It goes without saying that the role being demanded of Japan in the international community is not limited to Asia. As destabilizing factors for the international order become further diversified, Japan will be required to assume greater responsibilities than before regarding global challenges in cooperation with the United States and other friendly nations. In Chapter 2, we reviewed how post-war Japan developed its role in the stabilization of the international order. Japan in the 21st century will have to accelerate this trend and take on further responsibilities. The international community appreciates Japan’s proactive contribution to peace that has steadily developed since the first half of the 1990s, and expects that Japan will play a greater role than before in the field of security on a global scale. Going forward, Japan must not halt in its path of proactive contribution to peace including non-military activities, but further embody it and meet the expectations of the international community. Much is also expected of the role of Japan in the stabilization of the international order on the economic front. The 21st century world is flooded with regional economic agreements, and attempts by emerging economies to make their own standards be universally accepted. In order to maintain and enhance free trade, which has become the system at the core of the development of the world economy in the 20th century, in the 21st century, the formulation of universal rules in which a large number of countries participate is required. The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement, which is currently under negotiations, will become universal rules for free trade in the Asia-Pacific region. In addition, for Japan to play a leading role in the revival of the World Trade Organization (WTO), whose influence is showing signs of waning, and to seek to construct a worldwide free trade system will be a significant initiative for the stability of the international economic order. In a world where decision-making becomes fragmented and no country leads the charge for further trade liberalization, Japan has a huge responsibility indeed. Japan should go beyond the TPP and should further lead the move towards the establishment of the Free Trade Area of Asia-Pacific (FTAAP).

The contribution measures listed above are not completely new to Japan. Rather, they are indeed the expansion of the international contributions by Japan that bore fruit during the 70 post-war years. However, it is not rare for a country to be confronted with concerns and opposition both at home and abroad when it expands its international role. The Government of Japan will be required to make efforts to provide sufficient explanation regarding the significance of the new contributions to the people of Japan in order to gain their understanding. Japan will also be required to be willing to explain thoroughly to other countries that Japan is a country which achieves goals through agreement with countries concerned based on shared values in the international community.
6. What are the specific measures that Japan should take on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II?

Following the points presented by the Prime Minister, this Panel took a look back through the course of the world and Japan in the 20th century, and has considered the direction that the world and Japan should take in the future. Based on the discussions held, this Panel categorizes the specific measures which should be taken by Japan from the perspectives of “deepening the understanding of history,” “supporting the international order,” “contributing to peace and development,” and “opening up Japan” and recommends that the following points be considered.

(1) “Deepening the Understanding of History”
(a) Strengthening modern and contemporary history education
Japanese education on modern and contemporary history is awfully inadequate, and modern and contemporary history education in high schools and universities should be strengthened. With regard to high schools, it is desirable to establish a subject on modern and contemporary history, and to make it part of the compulsory curriculum. For the contents of education of this subject, it is necessary to bring together experts in Japanese history, world history, political economy, civics, geography, etc. and conduct a fundamental examination from the perspective of “Japan in the World.”

(b) Joint studies on history
Opportunities should be provided for researchers from around the world to engage in joint studies on world history and Asian history. Up to now, Japan has conducted historical studies on a bilateral basis with China and the Republic of Korea, respectively. However, it should aim to conduct historical studies with participation from a large number of countries on the themes of wars, colonial rule, and revolutions in the 20th century in order to further deepen mutual understanding of the histories of each country, as well as to look back at the past from a global perspective.

Furthermore, establishment of an international forum to study how international relations in the 21st century may be considered. It is desirable that the private sector will be the principle driver to promote these programs, and that the government will provide support for the programs from a distance.

(c) Upgrading the Japan Center for Asian Historical Records
The Japan Center for Asian Historical Records, managed by the National Archives of Japan, is held in high esteem not only domestically but also by academics from other Asian countries. However, materials currently handled are limited to those from the periods prior to World War II. Thus, it is also necessary to collect and make public materials from the post-war years.
(d) Dealing with the issue of the war dead
During World War II, many soldiers were sent to the battlefront without being provided sufficient weapons or food, and the people of Japan were subjected to air raids, resulting in many casualties. The government must strengthen efforts to tackle such issues of the war dead as gathering their remains.

(2) “Supporting the International Order”
(a) The UN reform
The function of the United Nations Security Council, which should play a central role in maintaining peace and resolving disputes, has recently declined. Japan has long advocated the reform of the UN Security Council, and there is a need to accelerate this effort.

(b) Poverty reduction
Japan should further strengthen efforts to reduce poverty, which is a major cause of conflict and violence in the international community. To that end, it is important to continue to support the realization of sustainable economic growth. The development of infrastructure, vitalization of trade and investment, development of legal systems, development of human resources, etc. should also be pursued. For this purpose, it is necessary to increase Japan’s official development assistance (ODA), which currently remains around 0.2% of GDP. It is also necessary to strive to enhance the quality of measures to fight poverty by sharing the lessons and achievements of the past domestically and internationally.

(c) Human security
In today’s world where problems such as poverty, environmental destruction, natural disasters, and conflicts interact across borders, conventional responses that are centered on states are becoming insufficient. Japan should become even more active in undertaking measures regarding environmental problems, climate change, and natural disasters; humanitarian aid and the rescue of people impacted by conflicts; and efforts for the post-2015 Development Agenda among others, under the concept of human security so that individuals can live with dignity.

Support for the international organizations such as Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and UNICEF should be further strengthened, and support that utilizes Japanese expertise and human resources through the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and NGOs should also be enhanced. It is also necessary to encourage confidence-building through support at the grassroots level in providing support in unstable areas.
(d) Women’s empowerment and facilitating their active role in the international community
It is necessary to further strengthen international cooperation for facilitating women’s active role, particularly assistance to developing countries, and to promote exchanges of women with other countries.

With regard to the national action plan under the UN Security Council Resolution 1325, the first Security Council resolution that explicitly connected women and the issue of peace and security, Japan has not formulated its national action plan. Japan needs to make efforts to formulate it expeditiously and to conduct its implementation and evaluation thorough collaboration between the government and civil society.

(e) Promotion of disarmament and non-proliferation
Japan should make further contributions to the stability of the international community by further strengthening the leadership that it has demonstrated to date in disarmament and non-proliferation. Regulation on armament and transfer of conventional weapons; as well as prevention of proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, related materials and technologies such as means of their delivery; will constitute important international contributions by Japan.

(f) Promoting inter-civilizational dialogue
Japan needs to further deepen its dialogue with other religions and civilizations, such as the Islamic world, in light of the fact that differences in race, ethnicity, or religion are not infrequently a major cause of conflict.

(3) “Contributing to peace and development”
(a) Enhancing the security framework
The Japan-U.S. Alliance is widely acknowledged as an international public good that contributes to stability in the Asia-Pacific region. It is necessary for Japan to reconsider its own defense system and to further enhance this Japan-U.S. Alliance.

Since the burden for supporting the Japan-U.S. security arrangements falls too heavily on Okinawa, further efforts are required so that the whole of Japan will bear the burden. Furthermore, the Self-Defense Forces should actively participate in international peace cooperation activities and contribute to the stability of the world. In doing so, it is necessary to fully study increasingly diversified and complex local conditions, PKO missions and reconstruction support, relationships with humanitarian aid organizations.

(b) Maintaining and upgrading the free trade system
In order to maintain and upgrade the free trade system, Japan should lead the move towards the establishment of the Free Trade Area of Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) in addition to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement currently under negotiations. It is also significant to
work to revive the World Trade Organization (WTO), whose influence is showing signs of waning, and seek to construct a worldwide free trade system.

(c) Contribution to the international community by making use of Japan’s knowledge, experience and technology
It is important for universities and the private sector to promote cooperation for infrastructure development in countries around the world by utilizing Japan’s sophisticated industrial technology.

Both the public and private sectors should promote further cooperation with other countries in areas such as environmental pollution, climate change, and disaster risk reduction, where Japan has ample knowledge, experience and technology.

(4) “Opening Up Japan”
(a) Transformation into an open society
In order to adapt to the rapidly progressing global diversification, it is necessary to create an open society by eliminating as many domestic regulations as possible and by changing the ways of thinking.

(b) Developing international human resources
Development of human resources capable of participating actively and widely in the international community should be strengthened. An emphasis should be placed on the development of human resources with expert knowledge and hands-on capabilities who are capable of working actively on an international level in every area, including in international organizations such as the United Nations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and businesses. In addition to development of young human resources, high-level experts and senior level human resources should also be dug up and utilized effectively. From this perspective, strengthening Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers (JOCSV) is also important. As the number of people participating in the JOCSV is on the decline, the government and the private sector are also required to work together to enhance the attractiveness of participating in the JOCSV, in order to secure highly capable personnel.

(c) Youth exchanges in Asia
It is necessary to further vitalize youth exchanges with Asian countries, like the “Peace, Friendship, and Exchange Initiative” implemented on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the end of the war. It is particularly important to prioritize increasing youth exchanges with countries with which reconciliation between Japan has yet to see progress.